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HAND DELIVERY 
Mr. Stephen Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
November 4,2008 
Re: State of ldaho v. Swindle (Docket No. 34658) 
Letter of Supplemental Authority 
Dear Mr. Kenyan: 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 34(9, the state respectfully submits the following additional 
cases as authority: 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (suppression issue) 
Maryland v. ~r inqle, 540 U.S. 366, 372-73 (2003) (suppression issue) 
Copies of the foregoing cases are enclosed for the Court's 
convenience. 
Sincerely, 
V .  Jess~ca M. Lorello 
Deputy Attorney General 
Enclosures 
cc: Heather M. Carlson 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
Criminal Law Division 
RO. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 854-8074 
Located at 700 W. State Street 
Joe R. Williams Building, 4th Floor 
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P 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Donald Curtis SAMSON, Petitioner, 
v. 
CALIFORNIA. 
No. 04-9728. 
Argued Feb. 22,2006. 
Decided June 19,2006 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
California Appellate Division of the Superior Court 
of possession of methamphetamine. Defendant 
appealed. The California Court of Appeal, &r, J., 
2004 WL 23071 1 1 ,  affirmed. Defendant appealed. 
Certiorari was granted. 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it 
intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the 
other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate govemnentai interests. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
pJ Pardon and Parole 284 -64.1 
284 Pardon and Pamle 
284I1 Parole 
284k44 Parole Conditions; Validity 
284k64.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Parole is an established variation on imprisonment of 
convicted criminals; the essence of parole is release 
from prison, before the completion of sentence, on 
the condition that the prisoner abides by certain rules 
during the balance of the sentence. 
Holding: The United States Supreme Court, Justice 
m, held that suspicionless search of California Pardon and Parole 284 -68 
narolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Pardon and Parole 
Affirmed 28411 Parole 
284k68 k. Supervision of Parolee; Search. 
Justice Stevens filed an opinion dissenting in which Most Cited Cases 
Justices $,&Q& and joined.. Suspicionless search of California parolee, conducted pursuant to California law requiring all parolees to 
agree to be subjected to search or seizure at any time, West Readnotes did not violate the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A. 
Searches and Seizures 349 -23 
349 Searches and Seizures 
-
3491 In General 
-
m k. Fourth Amendment and 
Reasonableness in General. Most Cited Cases 
The United States Supreme Court examines the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a 
search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Coust.Amend. 4. 
Searches and Seizures 349 -23 
349 Searches and Seizures 
3491 In General 
-
k. Fourth Amendment and 
Reasonableness in General. Most Cited Cases 
Mether  a search is reasonable is determined by 
Const.Amend. 4.; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code 6 
3067(a). 
- 
FN* The syllahus constitutes no part of the 
-
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
bv the Renorter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See United Stales 
1,. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 
321,337.26 S.Ct. 282.50 L.Ed. 499. 
Pursuant to a California statute-which requires every 
prisoner eligible for release on state parole to "agree 
in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a 
parole officer or other peace officer ..., with or 
without a search warrant and with or without cause"- 
and based solely on petitioner's parolee status, an 
officer searched petitioner and found 
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methamphetamine. The trial court denied his motions 
to suppress that evidence, and he was convicted of 
possession. Affirming, the State Court of Appeal held 
ihat suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful 
under California law and that the search in this case 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
because it was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. 
Held. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a 
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search 
of a parolee. Pp. 2197 - 2202. 
(a) The "totality of the circumstances" must be 
examined to determine whether a search is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. United Sfatcs v. 
Kni~hts. 534 U.S. 112, 118. 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 
L.Ed.2d 497. Reasonableness "is determined by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the 
search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on 
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 
I d ,  at 118-119. 122 S.Ct. 587. Applying this 
approach in &&&& the Court found reasonable the 
warrantless search of a probationer's apartment based 
on reasonable suspicion and a probation condition 
authorized by California law. In evaluating the 
degree of intrusion into Knights' privacy, the Court 
found his probationary status "salient," id.. at 118, 
122 S.Ct. 587, observing that probation is on a 
continuum of possible punishments and that 
probationers "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty' " of 
other citizens, id., at 119. 122 S.Ct. 587. It also 
found probation searches necessary to promote 
legitimate governmental interests of integrating 
probationers back into the community, combating 
recidivism, and protecting potential victims. 
Balancing those interests, the intrusion was 
reasonable. However, because the search was 
predicated on both the probation search condition and 
reasonable suspicion, the Court did not address the 
reasonableness of a search solely predicated upon the 
probation condition. Pp. 2197 - 2198. 
(b) Parolees, who are on the "continuum" of state- 
imposed punishments, have fewer expectations of 
privacy than probationers, because parole is more 
akin to imprisonment than probation is. "The essence 
*844 of parole is release from prison, before the 
completion of sentence, on the condition that the 
prisoner abides by certain rules during the balance of 
the sentence." Morrinev v. Brewr. 408 U.S. 471. 
477, 92 S.Ct. 2593. 33 L.Ed.2d 484. **2195 
California's system is consistent with these 
observations. An inmate electing to complete his 
sentence out of physical custody remains in the 
Department of Corrections' legal custody for the 
remainder of his term and must comply with the 
terms and conditions of his parole. The extent and 
reach of those conditions demonstrate that parolees 
have severely diminished privacy expectations by 
virtue of their status alone. Additionally, as in 
&gh& the state law's parole .search condition was 
clearly expressed to petitioner, who signed an order 
submitting to the condition and thus was 
unambiguously aware of it. Examining the totality of 
the circumstances, petitioner did not have an 
expectation of privacy that society would recognize 
as legitimate. The State's interests, by contrast, are 
substantial. A State has an "overwhelming interest" 
in supervising parolees because they "are more likely 
to commit future criminal offenses." Pennsvlvania 
Bd o f  Probation and Parole v, Scott. 524 U.S. 357. 
365, 1 I8 S.Ct. 2014. 141 L.Ed.2d 344. Similarly, a 
State's interests in reducing recidivism, thereby 
promoting reintegration and positive citizenship 
among probationers and parolees, warrant privacy 
intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under 
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment does not 
render States powerless to address these concerns 
effectively. California's 60-to-70-percent recidivism 
rate demonstrates that most parolees are ill prepared 
to handle the pressures of reintegration and require 
intense supervision. The State Legislature has 
concluded that, given the State's number of parolees 
and its high recidivism rate, an individualized 
suspicion requirement would undermine the State's 
ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect 
the public from criminal acts by reoffenders. 
Contrary to petitioner's argument, the fact that some 
States and the Federal Government require a level of 
individualized suspicion before searching a parolee is 
of little relevance in determining whether California's 
system is drawn to meet the State's needs and is 
reasonable, taking into account a parolee's 
substantially diminished expectation of privacy. Nor 
is there merit to the argument that California's law 
grants discretion without procedural safeguards. The 
concern that the system gives officers unbridled 
discretion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting 
dignitary harms that arouse shong resentment in 
parolees and undermine their ability to reintegrate 
into society, is belied by the State's prohibition on 
arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches. And 
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petitioner's concern that the law frustrates 
reintegration efforts by permitting intrusions into the 
privacy interests of third persons is unavailing 
because that concern would arise under a suspicion- 
based system as well. Pp. 2198 - 2202. 
Affirmed. 
THOMAS, I., delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which ROBERTS, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, 
GINSBURG, and &KQ, JJ., joined. STEVENS, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and 
BREYER, JJ., joined. 
Ronald E. Nivel; for respondent. 
Jonathan L. Marcus, for United States as amicus 
curiae, by special leave of Court, supporting 
respondent. 
Martin Kassman, San Francisco, CA, Robert A. 
m, Counsel of Record, Theodore P. Metzler, 
Nicholas Cartier, Covington & Burling, Washington, 
DC, for Petitioner.For U.S Supreme Court briefs, 
see:2005 WL 3785204 (Pet.Brief)2006 WL 353467 
(Reply .Brief) 
**2196 Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
*846 Califomia law provides that every prisoner 
eligible for release on state parole "shall agree in 
writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole 
officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or 
night, with or without a search warrant and with or 
without cause." Cal.Penal Code Ann. 6 3067(a) 
(West 2000). We granted certiorari to decide whether 
a suspicionless search, conducted under the authority 
of this statute, violates tlie Constitution. We hold that 
it does not. 
In September 2002, petitioner Donald Curtis Samson 
was on state parole in California, following a 
conviction for being a felon in possession of a 
firearm. On September 6, 2002, Officer Alex 
Rohleder of the San Bruno Police Department 
observed petitioner walking down a street with a 
woman and a child. Based on a prior contact with 
petitioner, Officer Rohleder was aware that petitioner 
was on parole and believed that he was facing an at 
large warant. Accordingly, Officer Rohleder stopped 
petitioner and asked him whether he had an 
outstanding parole warrant. Petitioner responded that 
there was no outstanding warrant and that he "was in 
good standing with his parole agent." Brief for 
Petitioner 4. Officer Rohleder confirmed, by radio 
dispatch, that petitioner was on parole and that he did 
not have an outstanding warrant. Nevertheless, 
pursuant to Cal.Pena1 Code Ann. 6 3067(a) (West 
2000) and based solely on petitionerGs*847 status as a 
parolee, Officer Rohleder searched petitioner. During 
the search, Officer Rohleder found a cigarette box in 
petitioner's left breast pocket. Inside the box he found 
a plastic baggie containing methamphetamine. 
The State charged petitioner with possession of 
methamphetamine pursuant to Cal. Health & Safety 
Code Ann. 5 11377(a) (West 1991). The trial court 
denied petitioner's motion to suppress the 
methamphetamine evidence, finding that Cal.Pena1 
Code Ann. 6 3067(a) (West 2000) authorized the 
search and that the search was not "arbitraty or 
capricious." App. 62-63 (Proceedings on Motion to 
Supress). A jury convicted petitioner of the 
possession charge and the trial court sentenced him to 
seven years' imprisonment. 
The Califomia Court of Appeal affirmed. Relying on 
People v Reves, 19 Cal.4th 743. 80 Cal.Rc&&i,BL 
968 P.2d 445 119981, the court held that suspicionless 
searches of parolees are lawful under California law; 
that " '[sluch a search is reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as it is not 
arbitrary, capricious or harassing' "; and that the 
search in this case was not arbitrary, capricious, or 
harassing. No. A102394 (Ct.App.Cal., 1st App. Dist., 
Oct. 14,2004), App 12-14. 
We granted certiorari, 
162 L.Ed2d 933 (20051, to answer a variation of the 
question this Court lefi open in United States v. 
Kni~hts 534 U.S. 112. 120. n. 6. 122 S.Ct. 587. 151 
LEdd2d 497 (2001)-whether a condition of release 
can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner's 
reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless 
search by a law enforcement officer would not offend 
the Fourth ~ m e n d m e n t . ~  Answering that question 
in the affirmative today, we affirm the judgment of 
the California Court of Appeal. 
FNI. Kniqhts, 534 U.S.. at 120. n. 6. 122 
S.Ct. 587 ("We do not decide whether the 
probation condition so diminished, or 
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completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable 
expectation of privacy ... that a search by a 
law enforcement officer without any 
individualized suspicion would have 
satisfied the reasonableness requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment"). 
JlJpJ "[Ulnder our general Fourth Amendment 
approach" we "examin [el the totality of the 
circumstances" to determine whether a search is 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. Id.,  at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Whether a search is 
reasonable "is determined by assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests." Id, at 11 8-1 19, 122 S.Ct. 
587 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
-
We recently applied this approach in Unlled Slates v. 
KJ& In that case, California law required 
Knights, as a probationer, to" '[slubmit his ... person, 
property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, 
to search anytime, with or without a search warrant, 
warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any 
probation officer or law enforcement officer.' " I& 
at 114. 122 S.Ct. 587 (brackets in original). Several 
days after Knights had been placed on probation, 
police suspected that he had been involved in several 
incidents of arson and vandalism. Based upon that 
suspicion and pursuant to the search condition of his 
probation, a police officer conducted a warrantless 
search of Knights' apartment and found arson and 
drug paraphernalia. & at 115-1 16, 122 S.Ct. 587. 
We concluded that the search of Knights' apartment 
was reasonable. In evaluating the.degree of intrusion 
into Knights' privacy, we found Knights' 
probationary status "salient," id.. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 
observing that "[plrobation is 'one point ... on a 
continuum of possible punishments ranging from 
solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility 
to a few hours of mandatory community service.' " 
122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Griffin vY 
Wisconrin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164. 97 
L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). Cf. Hudsoiz v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 
517, 530. 104 S.Ct. 3194. 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (19841 
(holding that prisoners have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy). We krther observed that, by 
virtue of their status alone, probationers " 'do not 
enjoy "the absolute liberty to which every "849 
citizen is entitled," ' " Knirhts, supra, at 119. 122 
S.Ct. 587 (quoting Griffin, supra, at 874. 107 S.Ct. - .
3164, in turn quoting Murrisscv v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593. 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (19721), 
justifying the "impos[ition] [of] reasonable 
conditions that deprive the offender of some 
freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens." 
Knighfs,supra, at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587. We also 
considered the facts that Knights' probation order 
clearly set out the probation search condition, and 
that Knights was clearly informed of the condition. 
See We 
concluded that under these circumstances, Knights' 
expectation of privacy was significantly diminished. 
See id., at 119-120. 122 S.Ct. 587. 
We also concluded that probation searches, such as 
the search of Knights' apartment, are necessary to the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 
Noting the State's dual interest in integrating 
probationers back into the community and combating 
recidivism, see id .  at 120-121, 122 S.Ct. 587, we 
credited the " 'assumptio~~' " that, by virtue of his 
status, a probationer " 'is more likely than the 
ordinary citizen to violate the law.' " Id .  at 120, 
122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Griffin.suora, at 880. 107 
S.Ct. 3164). We further found that "probationers 
have even more of an incentive to conceal their 
criminal activities and quickly dispose of 
incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal 
because probationers are aware that they may be 
subject to supervision and face revocation *"2198 of 
probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings 
in which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, among other things, do not apply.'' 
Kniphfs. 534 U.S.. at 120, 122 S.Ct. 587. We 
explained that the State did not have to ignore the 
reality of recidivism or suppress its interests in 
"protecting potential victims of criminal enterprise" 
for fear of running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct 587. 
Balancing these interests, we held that "[wlhen an 
officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer 
subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal 
activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal 
conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the 
probationer's significantly diminished privacy*850 
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interests is reasonable." Ibid. Because the search at 
issue in &&& was predicated on both the 
probation search condition and reasonable suspicion, 
we did not reach the question whether the search 
would have been reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment had it been solely predicated upon the 
condition of probation. Id.. at 120. n. 6. 122 S.Ct. 
587.0ur attention is directed to that question today, 
- 
albeit in the context of a parolee search. 
121 As we noted in parolees are on. the 
"continuum" of state-imposed punishments. 
119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). On this continuum, parolees have fewer 
expectations of privacy than probationers, because 
parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is 
to imprisonment. As this Court has pointed out, 
"parole is an established variation on imprisonment 
of convicted criminals .... The essence of parole is 
release from prison, before the completion of 
sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abides by 
certain rules during the balance of !he sentence." 
Morrissev, suoru, at 477. 92 S.Ct. 2593. "In most 
cases, the State is willing to extend parole only 
because it is able to condition it upon compliance 
with certain requirements." Pennsvlvaniu Bd of 
Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357. 365, 
118 S.Ct. 2014. 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998). See also 
United States v. Reves. 283 F.3d 446. 461 (C.A.2 
2002) ("[Fjederal supervised release, ... in contrast to 
probation, is meted out in addition to, not in lieu of, 
incarceration" (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Cardona. 903 F.2d 60, 
63 (C.A.1 1990) ("[Oln the Court's continuum of 
possible punishments, parole is the stronger 
medicine; ergo, parolees enjoy even less of the 
average citizen's absolute liberty than do 
probationers" (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)).= 
FN2. Contrary to the dissent's contention, 
-
nothing in our recognition that parolees are 
more akin to prisoners than probationers is 
inconsistent with our precedents. Nor, as the 
dissent suggests, do we equate parolees with 
prisoners for the purpose of concluding that 
parolees, like prisoners, have no Fourth 
Amendment rights. See post, at 2204 
(opinion of STEVENS, J.). That view 
misperceives our holding. If that were the 
basis of our holding, then this case would 
have been resolvedsolely under Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 
L.Ed.2d 393 (19841, and there would have 
been no cause to resort to Fourth 
Amendment analysis. See ihid.(holding 
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis of 
the totality of the circumstances inapplicable 
to the question whether a prisoner had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
orison cell). Nor is our rationale inconsistent 
with ~ori i ssev  v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471, 
482. 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (19721. 
In that case, the Court recognized that 
restrictions on a parolee's lib& are not 
unqualified. That statement, even if accepted 
as a truism, sheds no light on the extent to 
which a parolee's constitutional rights are 
indeed limited-and no one argues that a 
parolee's constitutional rights are not 
limited. Morrissey itself does not cast 
doubt on today's holding give11 that the 
liberty at issue in that case-the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process right to a hearing 
before revocation of parole-invokes wholly 
different analysis than the search at issue 
here. 
""2199 *851 California's system of parole is 
consistent with these observations: A California 
inmate may serve his parole period either in physical 
custody, or elect to complete his sentence out of 
physical custody and subject to certain conditions. 
Cal.Pena1 Code Ann. S 3060.5 (West 2000). Under 
the latter option, an inmate-turned-parolee remaiils in 
the legal custody of the California Department of 
Corrections through the remainder of his term, 5 
3056, and must comply with all of the terms and 
conditions of parole, including mandatory drug tests, 
restrictions on association with felons or gang 
members, and mandatory meetings with parole 
officers, Cal.Code Regs.. tit. 15. 6 2512 f2905]; 
Cal.Penal Code Ann. 6 3067 (West 2000). See also 
Morrissev.su~ra. at 478, 92 S.Ct 2593 (discussing 
other permissible terms and conditions of parole). 
General conditions of parole also require a parolee to 
report to his assigned parole officer immediately 
upon release, inform the parole officer within 72 
hours of any change in employment status, request 
permission to travel a distance of more than 50 miles 
from the parolee's home, and refrain from criminal 
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conduct and possession of firearms, specified 
weapons, or knives unrelated to employment. 
"852CaI.Code Re~s. ,  tit. 15, 6 2512. Parolees may 
also be subject to special conditions, including 
psychiatric treatment programs, mandatory 
abstinence from alcohol, residence approval, and 
"[alny other condition deemed necessary by the 
Board [of Parole Hearings] or the Department [of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation] due to unusual 
circumstances."§ 2513. The extent and reach of 
these conditions clearly demonstrate that parolees 
like petitioner have severely diminished expectations 
of privacy by virtue of their status alone. 
Additionally, as we found "salient" in &&& 
with respect to the probation search condition, the 
parole search condition under California law- 
requiring inmates who opt for parole to submit to 
suspicionless searches by a parole officer or other 
peace officer "at any time," Cal.Penal Code Ann. 5 
3067(a) (West 2000)-was "clearly expressed" to 
- 
petitioner. Kni~hts. 534 US.. at 119. 122 S.Ct. 587. 
He signed an order submitting to the condition and 
thus was "unambiguously" aware of it. In 
&&h& we found that acceptance of a clear and 
unambiguous search condition "significantly 
diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of 
privacy." Id, at 120, 122 S.Ct 587. Examining 
the totality of the circumstances pertaining to 
petitioner's status as a parolee, "an established 
variation on imprisonment," Morrissev, 408 U.S.. at 
477. 92 S.Ct. 2593, including the plain terms of the 
parole search condition, we conclude that petitioner 
did not have an expectation of privacy that society 
would recognize as ~ e ~ i t i m a t e . ~  
FN3. Because we find that the search at 
-
issue here is reasonable under our general 
Fourth Amendment approach, we need not 
reach the issue whether "acceptance of the 
search condition constituted consent in the 
sense of a comwlete waiver of his Fourth 
Amendment rights." Unired Stales v. 
Kniphts. 534 U.S. 112. 118, 122 S.Ct. 587, 
151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). The California 
Supreme Court has not vet construed 
Cai.~enal Code Ann. 6 3067 (West 2000), 
the statute which governs parole for crimes 
committed after 1996, and which imposes 
the consent requirement. The California 
Court of Appeal has, and it has concluded 
that, under m ( b ) ,  "inmates who are 
otherwise eligible for parole yet refuse to 
agree to the mandatory search condition will 
remain imprisoned ... until either the inmate 
(1) agrees to the search condition and is 
otherwise eligible for parole or (2) has lost 
all worktime credits and is eligible for 
release after having served the balance of 
hisiher sentence." People v. Middleton. 
131 Cal.Avv.4th 732. 739-740. 31 
Cal.Rptr.3d 813, 818 120051. Nonetheless, 
we decline to rest our holding today on the 
consent rationale. The California Supreme 
Court, we note, has not yet had a chance to 
address the question squarely, and it is far 
from clear that the State properly raised its 
consent theory in the courts below. 
Nor do we address whether California's 
~ a r o l e  search condition is justified as a 
special need under Griiiin v. Wisconsin. 
483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164. 97 L.Ed.2d 
709 (1987), because our holding under 
general Fourth Amendment principles 
renders such an examination unnecessiuy. 
**2200 "853 The State's interests, by contrast, are 
substantial. This Court has repeatedly acknowledged 
that a State has an "overwhelming interest" in 
supervising parolees because "parolees ... are more 
likely to commit future criminal offenses." 
Penizsvlvaaia Bd ofProbation and Parole, 524 US., 
at 365. 118 S.Ct 2014 (explaining that the interest in 
combating recidivism "is the very premise behind the 
system of close parole supervision"). Similarly, this 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State's 
interests in reducing recidivism and thereby 
promoting reintegration and positive citizenship 
among probationers and parolees warrant privacy 
intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under 
the Fourth Amendment. See Griffin, 483 US.. at 879, 
107 S.Ct. 3164: Kiziehts, supra, at 121, 122 S.Ct. 
587. 
-
The empirical evidence presented in this case clearly 
demonstrates the significance of these interests to the 
State of California. As of November 30, 2005, 
California had over 130,000 released parolees. 
California's parolee population has a 68-to-70 percent 
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recidivism rate. See California Attorney General, 
Crime in California 37 (Apr.2001) (explaining that 
68 percent of adult parolees are returned to prison, 55 
percent for a parole violation, 13 percent for the 
commission of a new felony offense); J. Petersilia, 
Challenges of Prisoner Reentry and Parole in 
California, 12 California Policy Research Center 
Brief, p. 2 (June 20001, available at http:/l *854 
www.ucop.edulcprc1parole.pdf (as visited June IS, 
2006, and available in Clerk of Court's case file) 
("70% of the state's paroled felons reoffend within I8 
months-the highest recidivism rate in the nation"). 
This Court has acknowledged the grave safety 
concerns that attend recidivism. See Ewinn v. 
Culifor~~ia, 538 U.S. 11. 26. 123 S.Q. 1179, 155 
L.Ed.2d 108 (20031 (plurality opinion) ("Recidivism 
is a serious public safety concern in California and 
throughout the Nation"). 
As we made clear in &&&the Fourth Amendment 
does not render the States powerless to address these 
concerns effectively. See 534 US.. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 
587. Contrary to petitioner's contention, California's 
-
ability to conduct suspicionless searches of parolees 
serves its interest in reducing recidivism, in a manner 
that aids, rather than hinders, the reintegration of 
parolees into productive society. 
In California, an eligible inmate serving a 
determinate sentence may elect parole when the 
actual days he has served plus statutory time credits 
equal the term imposed by the trial court, Cal.Pena1 
Code Ann. 66  2931, 2933, 3000(b)(l) (West 2000), 
irrespective of whether the inmate is capable of 
integrating himself back into productive society. As 
the recidivism rate demonstrates, most parolees are ill 
prepared to handle the pressures of reintegration. 
Thus, most parolees require intense supervision. The 
California Legislature has concluded that, given the 
number of inmates the State paroles and its high 
recidivism rate, a requirement that searches be based 
on individualized suspicion**2201 would undermine 
the State's ability to effectively supervise parolees 
and protect the public from criminal acts by 
reoffenders. This conclusion makes eminent sense. 
Imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement, as 
urged by petitioner, would give parolees greater 
ovvortunitv to anticipate searches and conceal 
ckkinali$. See ~ n i z i t s ,  suDra, at 120, 122 S.Ct. 
Griffin. 483 U.S.. at 879. 107 S.Ct. 3164. 
This Court concluded that the incentive-to-conceal 
concern justified an "intensive" system for 
supervising probationers in -id., at 875, 107 
S.Ct. 3164. That concern applies *855 with even 
greater force to a system of supervising parolees. See 
United Stutes v. Reves, 283 F.3d. at 461 (obsewing 
that the @YJ& rationale "appl[ies] u fortior?' to " 
Federal supervised release, which, in contrast to 
probation, is 'meted out in addition to, not in lieu of, 
incarceration' "); United States v. Crawford. 372 
F.3d 1048. 1077 (C.A.9 20041 (en banc) (Kleinfeld, 
J., conculring) (explaining that parolees, in contrast 
to probationers, "have been sentenced to prison for 
felonies and released before the end of their prison 
terms" and are "deemed to have acted more 
harmfully than anyone except those felons not 
released on parole"); Hudson, 468 U.S., at 526, 104 
S.Ct. 3194 (persons sentenced to terms of 
imprisotunent have been "deemed to have acted more 
harmfully than anyone except those felons not 
released on pamle"); id.. at 529, 104 S.Ct. 3194 
(observing that it would be " naive" to institute a 
system of " 'planned random searches' " as that 
would allow prisoners to "anticipate" searches, thus 
defeating the purpose of random searches). 
Petitioner observes that the majority of States and the 
Federal Government have been able to further similar 
interests in reducing recidivism and pronloting re- 
integration, despite having systems that permit 
parolee searches based upon some level of suspicion. 
Thus, petitioner contends, California's system is 
constitutionally defective by comparison. Petitioner's 
reliance on the practices of jurisdictions other than 
California, however, is misplaced. That some States 
and the Federal Government require a level of 
individualized suspicion is of little relevance to o w  
determination whether California's supervisory 
system is drawn to meet its needs and is reasonable, 
taking into account a parolee's substantially 
diminished expectation of privacy 
FN4. The dissent argues that, "once one 
-
acknowledges that parolees do have 
legitimate expectations of privacy beyond 
those of prisoners, our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence does not permit the 
conclusion, reached by the Court here for 
the first time, that a search supported by 
neither individualized suspicion nor 'special 
needs' is nonetheless 'reasonable.' " Post, 
at 2203. That simply is not the case. The 
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touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness, not iiidividualized 
suspicion. Thus, while this Court's 
jurisprudence has often recognized that "to 
accommodate public and private interests 
some quantum of individualized suspicion is 
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional 
search or seizure," United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543, 560, 96 
S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (19761, we 
have also recognized that the "Fourth 
Amendment imposes no irreducible 
requirement of such suspicion," &&.X& 
96 S.Ct. 3074. Therefore, although this 
Court has only sanctioned suspicionless 
searches in limited circumstances, namely 
programmatic and special needs searches, 
we have never held that these are the only 
limited circumstances in which searches 
absent individualized suspicion could be 
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. 
In light of California's earnest concerns 
respecting recidivism, public safety, and 
reintegration of parolees into productive 
society, and because the object of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness, our decision 
today is far from remarkable. Nor, given our 
prior precedents and caveats, is it 
"unprecedented." Post, at 2202. 
**2202 *856 Nor is there merit to the argument that 
California's parole search law permits "a blanket 
grant of discretion untethered by any procedural 
safeguards,"post, at 2202 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
The concern that California's suspicionless search 
system gives officers unbridled discretion to conduct 
searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms that 
arouse strong resentment in parolees and undermine 
their ability to reintegrate into productive society, is 
belied bv California's prohibition on " arbitrary, 
canricious or harassing" searches. See RevesJ 
,,TbL ' %. ,-", -- - , . ba,.L.vL8.-" ,-,. * " "  
P.2d. at 450, 451: Peo~ le  v Bravo. 43 Cal.3d 600 
610 7 2 Q P r l l  Rntr 787 73% D1l' 242 (& *, -I.,.. ?... I .&"  J J V .  * 
.ohation); see also Cal.Pena1 Code Ann. ! 
?west 2000) ("It is not the intent of the Legislature to 
- 
authorize law enforcement officers to conduct 
searches for the sole purpose of ha r a~sm en t " ) .~  
The dissent's claim that parolees under California law 
are subject to capricious searches conducted at the 
unchecked "whim" of law enforcement officers, pofl, 
at 2203, 2204, ignores this prohibition. Likewise, 
petitioner's concern that California's suspicionless 
search law frustrates reintegration efforts by 
permitting intrvsions into *857 the privacy interests 
of third parties is also unavailing because that 
concern would arise under a suspicion-based regime 
as well. 
a Under California precedent, we note, 
an officer would not act reasonably in 
conducting a suspiciouless search absent 
knowledge that the person stopped for the 
search is a parolee. See People v. Sanders, 
31 Cal.4th 318. 331-332, 2 Cal.Rutr.3d 630, 
73 P.3d 496. 505-506 (20031; Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 20. 
Thus, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit a police officer from conducting a 
suspiciouless search of a parolee. Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgment of the California Court of 
Appeal. 
/t is so ordered 
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER and 
Justice BREYER join, dissenting. 
Our prior cases have consistently assumed that the 
Fourth Amendment provides some degree of 
protection for probationers and parolees. The 
protection is not as robust as that afforded to ordinary 
citizens; we have held that probationers' lowered 
expectation of privacy may justify their warrantless 
search upon reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, see 
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 
587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 120011. We have also 
recognized that the supervisory responsibilities of 
probation officers, who are required to provide " 
'individualized counseling' " and to monitor their 
charges' progress, Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 U.S. 868, 
876-877. 107 S.Ct. 3164.97 L.Ed.2d 709 (19871, and 
who are in a unique position to judge "how close a 
supervision the probationer requires," id.. at 876, 
107 S.Ct. 3164, may give rise to special needs 
justifying departures from Fourth Amendment 
strictures. See ibid. ("Although a probation officer is 
not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police 
officer who normally conducts searches against the 
ordinary citizen"). But neither &&& nor &@& 
supports a regime of suspicionless searches, 
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conducted pursuant to a blanket grant of discretion 
untethered by any procedural safeguards, by law 
enforcement personnel who have no special interest 
in the welfare of the parolee or probationer. 
What the Court sanctions today is an unprecedented 
curtailment of liberty. Combining faulty syllogism 
with circular*858 reasoning, the Court concludes that 
parolees**2203 have no more legitimate an 
expectation of privacy in their persons than do 
prisoners. However superficially appealing that parity 
in treatment may seem, it runs roughshod over our 
precedent. It also rests on an intuition that fares 
poorly under scrutiny. And once one acknowledges 
that parolees do have legitimate expectations of 
privacy beyolid those of prisoners, our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence does not permit the 
conclusion, reached by the Court here for the first 
time, that a search supported by neither 
individualized suspicion nor "special needs" is 
nonetheless "reasonable." 
The suspicionless search is the very evil the Fourth 
Amendment was intended to stamp out. See &y& 
UniledSWes, 116 U.S. 616,625-630.6 S.Ct. 524.29 
L.Ed. 746 (1886); see also, e.g., Indianauolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32.37, 121 S.Ct. 447. 148 L.Ed.2d 
333 (2000). The pre-Revolutiona~y "writs of 
assistance," which permitted roving searches for 
contraband, were reviled precisely because they 
"placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of 
every peny officer.' " Bovd 116 US.. at 625. 6 
S.Ct. 524. While individualized suspicion "is not an 
'irreducible' component of reasonableness" under the 
Fourth Amendment, Edmond. 531 U.S., at 37. 121 
S.Ct. 447 (quoting U-eL 
428 U.S. 543. 561. 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 
11976)), the requirement has been dispensed with 
only when programmatic searches were required to 
meet a " 'special need' ... divorced from the State's 
general interest io law enforcement." Ferzuson v. 
L.Ed.2d 205 (2001); see Ed~nond, 531 US.. at 37, 
121 S.Ct. 447; see also Griftin. 483 U.S., at 873, 
107 S.Ct. 3164 ("Although we usually require that a 
search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and 
thus supported by probable cause, as the Constitution 
says warrants must he), ... we have permitted 
exceptions when 'special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable' "). 
Not surprisingly, the majority does not seek to justify 
the search of petitioner on "special needs" grounds. 
Although the Court has in the past relied on special 
needs to uphold *859 warrantless searches of 
probationers, &at 873, 880, 107 S.Ct. 3164, it has 
never gone so far as to hold that a probationer or 
parolee may he subjected to hll search at the whim 
of any law enforcement officer he happens to 
encounter, whether or not the officer has reason to 
suspect him of wrongdoing. C& after all, 
involved a search by a probation officer that was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. The special role 
of probation officers was critical to the analysis; "we 
deal with a situation," the Court explained, "in which 
there is an ongoing supervisory relationship-and one 
that is not, or at least not entirely, adversarial- 
between the object of the search and the 
decisionmaker." Id., at 879. 107 S.Ct. 3164. The 
State's interest or " special need," as articulated in 
was an interest in supervising the wayward 
probationer's reintegration into society-not, or at least 
not principally, the general law enforcement goal of 
detecting crime, see ante, at 2 2 0 0 . ~  
FNI. As we observed in Ferruson v. 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct 1281, 
149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001), special 
needs rationale was cast into doubt by our 
later decision in Skinner v. Railwav Labor 
Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602. 109 S.Ct. 
1402. 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (19891, which 
reserved the question whether " 'routine use 
in criminal prosecutions of evidence 
obtained pursuant to the administrative 
scheme would give rise to an inference of 
pretext, or otherwise impugn the 
administrative nature of the ... program,' " 
Fer,euson, 532 US., at 79, n. 1.5, 121 S.Ct. 
1281 (quoting Skinner. 489 U.S.. at 621. n. 
5. 109 S.Ct. 14021, But at least the State in 
@J& could in good faith contend that its 
warrantless searches were supported by a 
special need conceptually distinct from law 
enforcement goals generally. Indeed, that a 
State's interest in supervising its parolees 
and probationers to ensure their smooth 
reintegration may occasionally diverge from 
its general law enforcement aims is 
illustrated by this very case. Petitioner's 
possession of a small amount of illegal 
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drugs would not have been grounds for 
revocation of his parole. See Cal.Pena1 Code 
Ann. 6 3063.1 (a) (West Supp.2006). 
Presumably, the California Legislature 
determined that it is unnecessary and 
perhaps even counterproductive, as a means 
of furthering the goals of the parole system, 
to reincarcerate former prisoners for simple 
possession, The general law enforcement 
interests the State espouses, by contrast, call 
for reincarceration. 
**2204 It is no accident, then, that when we later 
upheld the search of a probationer by a law 
enforcement oflcer (again, *860 based on reasonable 
suspicion), we forwent any reliance on the special 
needs doctrine. See Kniehfs, 534 U.S. 112. 122 S.Ct. 
587. Even if the supervisory relationship between a 
-
probation officer and her charge may properly be 
characterized as one giving rise to needs "divorced 
from the State's general interest in law enforcement," 
Fereuson, 532 US., at 79, 121 S.Ct 1281; but see 
id,  at 79, n. 15. 121 S.Ct. 1281, the relationship 
between an ordinary law enforcemeilt officer and a 
probationer unknown to him may not. "None of our 
special needs precedents has sanctioned the routine 
inclusion of law enforcement, both in the design of 
the policy and in using arrests, either threatened or 
real, to implement the system designed for the special 
needs objectives." Id.. at 88. 121 S.Ct. 1281 
(KENNEDY, I., concurring in judgment). 
Ignoring just how "closely guarded" is that "category 
of constitutionally permissible suspicionless 
searches," Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305. 309, 
1 1  7 S.Ct, 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (19971, the Court 
for the first time upholds an entirely suspicionless 
search unsupported by any special need. And it goes 
further: In special needs cases we have at least 
insisted upon programmatic safeguards designed to 
ensure evenhandedness in application; if 
individualized suspicion is to be jettisoned, it must be 
replaced with measures to protect against the state 
- 
actor's unfettered discretion. See, e.%. D _ e l a z  
- -- 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648. 654-655, 99 S.Ct. 1391. 59 
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (where a special need "precludes 
insistence upon 'some quantum of individualized 
suspicion,' other safeguards are generally relied upon 
to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation 
of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the 
official in the field' " (quoting Cu~nara v. Municipal 
Fourth Amendment demands somethine more than 
the broad and unlimited discretion s&ght by the 
Government"). Here, by contrast, there are no 
policies in place-no "standards, guidelines, or 
procedures," Prouse. 440 US.. at 650.99 S.Ct. 1391- 
to rein in officers and furnish a *861 bulwark against 
the arbitrary exercise of discretion that is the height 
of unreasonableness. 
The Court is able to make this unprecedented move 
onlv bv making another. Coupling the dubious 
holhing of ~ u d i o n  v. Palmer. 468 -u.s. 5 17, 1 04 
S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed2d 393 (19841, with the bald 
statement that "~arolees have fewer expectations of 
privacy than probationers,"ante, at 2198, the Court 
two-steps its way through a faulty syllogism and, 
thus, avoids the application of Fourth Amendment 
principles altogether. The logic, apparently, is this: 
Prisoners have no legitimate**2205 expectation of 
privacy; parolees are like prisoners; therefore, 
parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy. 
The conclusion is remarkable not least because we 
have long embraced its opposite.m It also rests on 
false premises. First, it is simply not hue that a 
parolee's status, vis-a-vis either the Stale or the 
Constitution, is tantamount to that of a prisoner or 
even materially distinct from that of a nrobationer. 
See ~ o r r i s s w ~ v .  Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,482.92 S.Ct. 
2593. 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (19721 ("Though the State 
properly subiects ia ~aroleel  to many restrictions not 
ap$icabie tb othkr 'citizens, his cbndition is very 
different from that of confinement in a prison"). A 
parolee, like a probationer, is set free in the world 
subject to restrictions intended to facilitate 
supervision and guard against antisocial behavior. As 
with probation, "the State is willing to extend parole 
only because it is able to condition it upon 
compliance with certain requirements." 
m. Certainly, parole differs from probation 
insofar as parole is " 'meted out in addition *862 to, 
not in lieu of, incarceration.' " Ante, at 2199 
(quoting United Slntes v. Reves, 283 F.3d 446. 461 
(C.A.2 20022). And, certainly, parolees typically will 
have committed more serious crimes-ones warranting 
a prior tern1 of imprisonment-than probationers. s he 
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latter distinction, perhaps, would support the 
conclusion that a State has a stronger interest in 
supervising parolees than it does in supervising 
probationers. But see United Stales v. Williams, 417 
F.3d 373. 376, n. I (C.A.3 2005) (" '[Tlhere is no 
constitutional difference between probation and 
parole for purposes of the [Fjourth [Almendment' "). 
But why either distinction should result in refusal to 
acknowledge as legitimate, when harbored by 
parolees, the same expectation of privacy that 
probationers reasonably may harbor is beyond 
fathom. 
FN2. See Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 
-
33 L.Ed.2d 484 
(1972) ("[Tlhe liberty of a parolee, although 
indeterminate. includes many of the core 
of unqualified libe11~;'); Griffin v, 
R'isco?zsin, 483 U.S. 868. 875. 107 S.Ct. 
3 164.97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (lhe "degree of 
impingement upon [a probationer's] privacy 
... is not unlimited"); see also Ferfuson. 532 
US.. at 101, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (SCALIA, J., 
dissenting) ("1 doubt whether Griffin's 
-, \ 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
home was any less than petitioners' 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
urine taken"). 
In any event, the notion that a parolee legitimately 
expects only so much privacy as a prisoner is utterly 
without foundation. Hudson v. Palmer does stand 
for the proposition that "[a] right of privacy in 
traditional Fourth Amendment terms" is denied 
individuals who are incarcerated. 468 U.S.. at 527, 
104 S.Ct. 3 194. But this is because it "is necessary, 
as a practical maner, to accommodate a myriad of 
'institutional needs and objectives' of prison facilities, 
... chief amone which is internal security." L d A  
524, 104 s . c t . 3  194; see 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I agree that the 
government's compelling interest in prison safety, 
together with the necessarily ad hoc judgments 
required of prison ofticials, make prison cell searches 
and seizures appropriate for categorical treatment" 
n.n); see also **2206Treasurv Emalovees v. Von 
Raab. 489 U.S. 656, 680, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 
L.Ed.2d 685 (19891 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). These 
"institutional needs"-safety of inmates and guards, 
"internal order," and sanitation, Hudson. 468 U.S.. at 
527-528. 104 S.Ct. 3194-manifestly*863 do not 
apply to parolees. As discussed above and ill 
*other state interests may warrant certain 
intrusions into a parolee's privacy, hut Hudson's 
rationale cannot be mapped blindly onto the situation 
with which we are presented in this case. 
FN3. Particularly in view of Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence, which emphasized 
the prison's programmatic interests in 
conducting suspicionless searches, see 
Hudson, 468 US.. at 538, 104 S.Ct. 
3 194. Hudson is probably best understood as 
a "special needs" case-not as standing for 
the blanket proposition that prisoners have 
no Fourth Amendment rights. 
Nor is it enough, in deciding whether someone's 
expectation of privacy is "legitimate," to rely on the 
existence of the offending condition or the 
individual's notice thereof. Cf. ante, at 2199.The 
Court's reasoning in this respect is entirely circular. 
The mere fact that a particular State refuses to 
acknowledge a parolee's privacy interest cannot mean 
that a parolee in that State has no expectation of 
privacy that society is willing to recognize as 
legitimate-especially when the measure that invades 
privacy is both the subject of the Fourth Amendment 
challenge and a clear outlier. With only one or two 
arguable exceptions, neither the Federal Government 
nor any other State subjects parolees to searches of 
the kind to which petitioner was subjected. And the 
fact of notice hardly cures the circularity; the loss of 
a subjective expectation of privacy would play "no 
meaningful role" in analyzing the legitimacy of 
expectations, for example, "if the Government were 
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that 
all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless 
enhy." Smith v. Mawland. 442 U.S. 735, 740-741. 
n. 5.99 S.Ct. 2577.61 L.Ed.2d220(19791!" 
FN4. Likewise, the State's argument that a 
California parolee "consents" to the 
suspicionless search condition is sophishy. 
Whether or not a prisoner can choose to 
remain in prison rather than be released on 
parole, cf. ante, at 2199, n. 3, he has no 
"choice" concerning the search condition; he 
may either remain in prison, where he will 
be subjected to suspicionless searches, or he 
may exit prison and still be subject to 
suspicionless searches. Accordingly, "to 
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speak of consent in this context is to resort 
to a manifest fiction, for the [parolee] who 
purportedly waives his rights by accepting 
such a condition has little genuine option to 
refuse." 5 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: 
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 4 
IO.lO(b), pp. 440-441 (4th ed.20041. 
"864 Threaded through the Court's reasoning is the 
suggestion that deprivation of Fourth Amendment 
rights is part and parcel of any convict's punishment. 
See ante, at 2197 - 2 1 9 9 . ~  If a person may be 
subject to random and suspicionless searches in 
prison, the Court seems to assume, then he cannot 
complain when he is subject to the same invasion 
outside of prison, so long as the State still can 
imprison him. Punishment, though, is not the basis on 
which was decided. (Indeed, it is settled that 
a prison inmate " 'retains those [constitutioi~al] rights 
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner 
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the 
corrections system.' " Turner v. Suflev. 482 U.S. 
78, 95, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (19872.) Nor, 
to my knowledge, have we ever sanctioned the use of 
any search as a punitive measure. Instead, the 
question in every case must be **2207 whether the 
balance of legitimate expectations of privacy, on the 
one hand, and the State's interests in conducting the 
relevant search, on the other, justifies dispensing with 
the warrant and probable-cause requirements that are 
otherwise dictated by the Fourth Amendment. That 
balance is not the same in prison as it is out. We held 
in &&&-without recourse to &&&&hat the 
balance favored allowing the State to conduct 
searches based on reasonable suspicion. Never before 
have we plunged below that floor absent a 
demonstration of "special needs." 
FNS. This is a vestige of the long- 
-
discredited "act of grace" theory of parole. 
Compare Escoe v. Zerhst, 295 U.S. 490, 
492-493.55 S.Ct. 81 8.79 L.Ed. 1566 (1935) 
f"Probation or suspension of sentence comes 
as an act of grace to one convicted of a 
crime, and may be coupled with such 
conditions in resoect of its duration as 
Congress may impose"), with Gaanon v. 
Scnruelli. 411 U.S. 778, 782, n. 4. 93 S.Ct. 
1756.36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) ("a probationer 
can no longer be denied due process, in 
reliance on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst. 
that   rob at ion is an 'act of trrace' " (citation 
omiied)). See also ~ o r r i s ~ r e x  408 u.s.. at 
482.92 S.Ct. 2593. 
Had the State imposed as a condition of parole a 
requirement that petitioner submit to random 
searches by his parole officer, who is "supposed to 
have in mind the welfare of the *865 [parolee]" and 
guide the parolee's transition back into society, 
Griffilz. 483 US., at 876-877. 107 S.Ct. 3164, the 
condition might have been justified either under the 
special needs doctrine or because at least part of the 
requisite "reasonable suspicion" is supplied in this 
context by the individual-specific knowledge gained 
through the supervisory relationship. See id., at 879, 
107 S.Ct. 3164 (emphasizing probation office's 
ability to "assess probabilities in the light of its 
knowledge of [the probationer's] life, character, and 
circumstances"). Likewise, this might have been a 
different case had a court or parole board imposed the 
condition at issue based on specific knowledge of the 
individual's criminal history and projected likelihood 
of reoffending, or if the State had had in place 
programmatic safeguards to ensure evenhandedness. 
See s u p ,  at 2 197. Under either of those scenarios, 
the State would at least have gone some way toward 
averting the greatest mischief wrought by officials' 
unfettered discretion. But the search condition here is 
imposed on all parolees-whatever the nature of their 
crimes, whatever their likelihood of recidivism, and 
whatever their supervisory needs-without any 
FN6 programmatic procedural protections.- 
FN6. The Court devotes a good portion of 
-
its analysis to the recidivism rates among 
parolees in California. See ante, at 2200. 
One might question whether those statistics, 
which postdate the Califomia Supreme 
Court's decision to allow the purportedly 
recidivism-reducing suspicionless searches 
at issue here, actually demonstrate that the 
State's interest is being served by the 
searches. Cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 10, 
and n. 10. Of course, one cannot deny that 
the interest itself is valid. That said, though, 
it has never been held sufficient to justify 
suspicionless searches. If high crime rates 
were grounds enough for disposing of 
Fourth Amendment protections, the 
Amendment long ago would have become a 
dead letter. 
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The Court seems to acknowledge that unreasonable 
searches "inflic[t] dignitary harms that arouse snong 
resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to 
reintegrate into productive society." Ante, at 2201; 
see Teriv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1. 19, 29. 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). It is satisfied, however, that 
the *866 California courts' prohibition against " 
'arbitrary, capricious or harassing' " searches suffices 
to avert those harms-which are of course 
counterproduc!ive to the State's purported aim of 
rehabilitating Former prisoners and reintegrating them 
into societv. See ante, at 2201 (citing Peoale v. 
Reves. 19 Cal.4th 743. 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734,968 P.2d 
445 (1998)). 1 am unpersuaded. The requirement of 
individualized suspicion, in all its iterations, is the 
shield the Framer~selected to guard against the evils 
of arbitrary action, caprice, and harassment. To say 
that those evils may be averted without that shield is, 
I fear, to pay lipservice to the end while withdrawing 
the means.m 
FN7. As the Court observes, see ante, at 
-
2202, n. 5, under California law "an officer 
is entitled to conduct suspicionless searches 
only of persons known by him to be 
parolees." Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 20 (citing Peoale v. Sanders. 3 1 
Cal.4th 318. 331-332. 2 CaI.R~tr.3d 630. 73 
P.3d 496, 505 (20032. It would necessarily 
be arbitrary, capricious, and harassing to 
conduct a suspicionless search of someone 
without knowledge of the status that renders 
that person, in the State's judgment, 
susceptible to such an invasion. 
Respectfully, I dissent. 
U.S.Ca1.,2006. 
Samson v. California 
547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed2d 250, 74 
USLW 4349, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 5257, 2006 
Daily Journal D.A.R. 7626, 2006 Daily Journal 
D.A.R. 7627, 2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7630, 19 
Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 306 
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Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted in the 
Circuit Court, Baltimore County, Christian M. Kahl, 
J., of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and 
possession of cocaine. Defendant appealed. The 
Court of Special Appeals, 141 Md.Auu. 292. 785 
A.2d 790, affinned. Defendant filed petition for writ 
of certiorari. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 3.22 
Md. 525. 805 A.2d 1016,Cathell, J., reversed. 
Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Chief 
Justice Rehnauist, held that police officer had 
probable cause to believe that defendant, who was the 
front-seat passenger in vehicle, committed the crime 
of possession of cocaine. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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**797 *366 Syllabus 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
-
opinion of the Court but has been prepared 
by the Reporter of Decisions for the 
convenience of the reader. See Unifed Slates 
v. Detroit Timber dl. Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 
321.337,26 S.Ct. 282.50 L.Ed. 499. 
A police officer stopped a car for speeding at 3:16 
a.m.; searched the car, seizing $763 from the glove 
compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat 
armrest; and arrested the car's three occupants after 
they denied ownership of the drugs and money. 
Respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger, was 
convicted of possession with intent to dishibute 
cocaine and possession of cocaine, and was 
sentenced to 10 years' incarceration without the 
possibility of parole. The Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals affirmed, but the State Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to 
show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control 
over the drugs, the mere finding of cocaine in the 
back armrest when Pringle was a front-seat passenger 
in a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to 
establish probable cause for an arrest for possession. 
Held: Because the officer had probable cause to 
arrest Pringle, the arrest did not contravene the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Maryland law 
authorizes police officers to execute warrantless 
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arrests, inter alia, where the officer has probable 
cause to believe that a felony has been committed or 
is being committed in the officer's presence. Were, it 
is uncontested that the officer, upon recovering the 
suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a 
felony had been committed; the question is whether 
he had probable cause to believe Pringle committed 
that crime. The "substance of all the definitions of 
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of 
guilt," 175. 
69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, and that belief must be 
particularized with respect to the person to be 
searched or seized, f'harm v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 
91. 100 S.Ct. 338. 62 L.Ed.2d 238. To determine 
whether an officer had probable cause to make an 
arrest, a court must examine the events leading up to 
the arrest, and then decide "whether these historical 
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively 
reasonable police officer, amount to" probable cause. 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690. 696. 116 
S.Ct. 1657. 134 L.Ed.2d 91 1. As it is an entirely 
reasonable inference from the facts here that any or 
all of the car's occupants had knowledge of, and 
exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine, a 
reasonable officer could conclude that there was 
probable cause to believe Pringle committed the 
crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or 
jointly. Pringle's attempt to characterize this as a 
guilt-by-association case is *367 unavailing. &EG 
v. Illinois. supra& and Unifed States v. Di Re. 332 
U.S. distinguished. 
Pp. 799-802. 
370 Md. 525, 805 A.2d 1016, reversed and 
remanded. 
REHNOUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion for a 
unanimous Court. 
**798 G a y  E. Bair, Baltimore, MD, for petitioner. 
Sri Srinivasan, for United States as amicus curiae, by 
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Nancv S. Forster, Baltimore, MD, for respondent. 
J .  Joseph Cunan, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, 
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Stevhen E. Harris, Nancv S. Forster, Deputy Public 
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Supreme Court Briefs, see:2003 WL 21999023 
Chief Justice REIINQUIST delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
In the early morning hours a passenger car occupied 
by three men was stopped for speeding by a police 
officer. The *368 officer, upon searching the car, 
seized $763 of rolled-up cash from the glove 
con~partment and five glassine baggies of cocaine 
from between the back-seat armrest and the back 
seat. After all three men denied ownership of the 
cocaine and money, the officer arrested each of them. 
We hold that the officer had probable cause to arrest 
Pringle-one of the three men. 
At 3:16 a.m. on August 7, 1999, a Baltimore County 
Police officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding. 
There were three occupants in the car: Donte Partlow, 
the driver and owner, respondent Pringle, the front- 
seat passenger, and Otis Smith, the back-seat 
passenger. The officer asked Partlow for his license 
and registration. When Partlow opened the glove 
compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration, the 
officer observed a large amount of rolled-up money 
in the glove compartment. The officer returned to his 
patrol car with Partlow's license and registration to 
check the computer system for outstanding 
violations. The computer check did not reveal any 
violations. The officer returned to the stopped car, 
had Partlow get out, and issued him an oral warning. 
After a second patrol car arrived, the officer asked 
Partlow if he had any weapons or narcotics in the 
vehicle. Partlow indicated that he did not. Partlow 
then consented to a search of the vehicle. The search 
yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five 
plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine from 
behind the back-seat armrest. When the officer began 
the search the armrest was in the upright position flat 
against the rear seat. The officer pulled down the 
armrest and found the drugs, which had been placed 
between the armrest and the back seat of the car. 
The officer questioned all three men about the 
ownership of the drugs and money, and told then1 
that if no one admitted to ownership of the drugs he 
was going to arrest them all. The men offered no 
information regarding the ownership*369 of the 
drugs or money. All three were placed under arrest 
and transported to the police station. 
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Later that morning, Pringle waived his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (19662, and gave an oral and written 
confession in which he acknowledged that the 
cocaine belonged to him, that be and his friends were 
going to a party, and that he intended to sell the 
cocaine or "[ulse it for sex." App. 26. Pringle 
maintained that the other occupants of the car did not 
know about the drugs, and they were released. 
**799 The trial court denied Pringle's motion to 
suppress his confession as the h i t  of an illegal 
arrest, holding that the officer had probable cause to 
arrest Pringle. A jury convicted Pringle of possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of 
cocaine. He was sentenced to 10 years' incarceration 
without the possibility of parole. The Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. 141 
Md.App. 292,785 A.2d 790 (200lb 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by divided vote, 
reversed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to 
show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control 
over the drugs, "the mere fmding of cocaine in the 
back armrest when [Priiigle] was a front seat 
passenger in a car being driven by its owner is  
insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest 
for possession!' 370 Md. 525, 545, 805 A.2d 1016, 
1027 (2002). We granted certiorari, 538 U.S. 92 1 ,  
123 S.Ct. 1571. 155 L.Ed.2d 31 l(20031, and now 
reverse. 
Under the Fourtb Amendment, made 
applicable to the States bv the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Maup v. Ohio. 36f U.S. 643. 81 S.Ct. 
1684. 6 L.Ed2d 1081 (19611, the people are "to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
. .  . 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, ... and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ...." 
U.S. Const., Amdt. 4. Maryland law authorizes police 
officers to execute warrantless arrests, infer alia, for 
felonies committed in an officer's presence or where 
an officer has probable cause to believe that a felony 
"370 has been committed or is being committed in 
the officer's presence. Md. Ann.Code. Art. 27. 4 
5948 (19961 (repealed 2001). A warrantless awest of 
an individual in a public place for a felony, or a 
misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence, is 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is 
supported by probable cause. Uizized States v. 
Watson. 423 U.S. 41 1, 424. 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 
598 (1976); see Atwater v Laao Yista, 532 U.S. 318, 
354. 121 S.Ct. 1536. 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (stating 
that "[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that 
an individual has committed even a very minor 
criminal offense in his presence, be may, without 
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the 
offender"). 
p$J It is uncontested in the present case that the 
officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine 
haggies containing suspected cocaine, had probable 
cause to believe a felony had been committed. &l& 
Ann.Code. Art. 27. 6 287 (1996) (repealed 2002) 
(prohibiting possession of controlled dangerous 
substances). The sole question is whether the officer 
had probable cause to believe that Pringle committed 
that crime,m 
FNI. Maryland law defines "possession" as 
"the exercise of actual or constructive 
dominion or control over a thine bv one e- 
more persons." Md. ~ n n . ~ o d l  Art. 27. 4 
277(s) (19961 (repealed 2002). 
The long-prevailing standard of probable 
cause protects "citizens from rash and unreasonable 
interferences with privacy and from unfounded 
charges of crime," while giving "fair leeway for 
enforcing the law in the community's protection." 
~ r i n e ~ a r  v. United Slates. 338 U:S. '160. 176, 69 
S.Ct. 1302. 93 L.Ed. 1879 (19491. On many 
occasions. we have reiterated that the prohable-cause "
standard is a " 'practical, nontechnicai conception' " 
that deals with " 'the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' " 
111indis v. Gates. 462 U.~.-213, 231. 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brineear, suora. at 
175-176. 69 S.Ct. 13021; see, e.g., **8000rnelas v. 
United States. 517 U.S. 690. 695, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 
134 L.Ed.2d 91 1 (1996); United Slates v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1, 7-8. 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d I 
m. "[PJrohable cause is a fluid *371 concept- 
turning on the assessment of probabilities in 
- 
particular factual contexts-not readily, or even 
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." 
Gares, 462 U.S.. at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317. 
@lJ9J The probable-cause standard is incapable of 
precise definition or quantification into percentages 
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because it deals with probabilities and depends on the 
totality of the circumstances. See & Brinepar. 
338 U.S., at 175. 69 S.Ct. 1302. We have stated, 
however, that "[tlhe substance of all the defmitions of 
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of 
guilt," &&(internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted), and that the belief of guilt must be 
particul~ized with respect to the person to be 
searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 
91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed2d 238 (19791. In 
we noted: 
"As early as Locke v. Uniled StalesS 7 Cranch 339, 
348. 3 L.Ed. 364 (18131, Chief Justice Marshall 
observed, in a closely related context: '[Tlhe term 
"probable cause," according to its usual 
acceotation. means less than evidence which wn~lld 
tustifv condemnation .... It iinports a seizure mnde " ,  
under circu~nstances which warrant suspicion ' ~~ ~ 
More recently, we said that 'the quanta ... of proof 
appropriate in ordiniuy judicial proceedings are 
inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. 
Brinepar, 338 U.S.. at 173. 69 S.Ct. 1302. Finely 
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, 
useful in formal trials, have no place in the 
[probable-cause] decision." 462 US.. at 235, 103 
S.Ct. 23 17. 
To determine whether an officer had probable 
cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events 
leading up to the arrest, and then decide "whether 
these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of 
an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to" 
probable cause, Omelas. supra, at 696. 116 S.Ct. 
1657. 
In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a 
Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of 
rolled-up cash "372 in the glove compartment 
directly in front of ~ r i n g l e . ~  Five plastic glassine 
baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat amrest 
and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning, 
the three men failed to offer any information with 
respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money. 
FN2. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
dismissed the $763 seized from the glove 
comparhnent as a factor in the probable- 
cause determination, stating that "[mloney, 
without more, is innocuous." 370 Md. 525, 
546, 805 A.2d 1016, 1028 (20021. The 
court's consideration of The money in 
isolation, rather than as a factor in the 
totalitv of the circumstances. is mistaken in ..
light of our precedents. See, e.g., Illinois v. 
Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 103 S.Ct. 
2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (19831 (opining that 
the totality of the circumstances approach is 
consistent with our prior treatment of 
probable cause); Brinepar v. United Slates, 
338 U.S. 160. 175-176. 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 
L.Ed. 1879 (1949) YProbable cause exists 
where 'the facts and circumstances within 
their [the officers'] knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy information 
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that' 
an offense has been or is being committed"). 
We think it is abundantly clear from the 
facts that this case involves more than 
money alone. 
We thimk it an entirely reasonable inference from 
these facts that any or all three of the occupants had 
knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control 
over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could 
**SO1 conclude that there was probable cause to 
believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of 
cocaine, either solely or jointly. 
Pringle's attempt to characterize this case as a guilt- 
bv-association case is unavailing. His reliance on .. 
Ybarra v. Illinois, suura, and United Sdafes v. Di Re, 
332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Q. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (19481, is 
misplaced. In Ybarra, police officers obtained a 
warrant to search a tavern and its bartender for 
evidence of possession of a controlled substance. 
Upon entering the tavern, the officers conducted 
patdown searches of the customers present in the 
tavern, including Ybama. Inside a cigarette pack 
retrieved from Ybarra's pocket, an officer found six 
tinfoil packets containing heroin. We stated: 
"[A] person's mere propinquity to others 
independently suspected of criminal activity does 
not, without more, *373 give rise to probable cause 
to search that person. Sibron v. New I'ork. 392 
U.S. 40. 62-631. 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 9171 
(1968'). Where the standard is probable cause, a 
search or seizure of a person must be supported by 
probable cause particularized with respect to that 
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peison. This requirement cannot be undercut or 
avoided by simply pointing to the fact that 
coincidentally there exists probable cause to search 
or seize another or to search the premises where the 
person nlay happen to be." 444 U.S.. at 91. 100 
S.Q. 338. 
We held that the search warrant did not permit body 
searches of all of the tavern's patrons and that the 
police could not pat down the patrons for weapons, 
absent individualized suspicion. Id. at 92, 100 S.Ct. 
338. 
-
This case is quite different from @gng Pringle and 
his two companions were in a relatively small 
automobile, not a public tavern. In Wvomin~ v. 
Houglzton, 526 U.S. 295. 119 S.Ct. 1297. 143 
L.Ed.2d 408 (19992 we noted that "a car passenger- 
unlike the unwitting tavern patron in --will 
often be engaged in a common enterprise with the 
driver, and have the same interest in concealing the 
fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing." 
304-305, 119 S.Ct. 1297. Here we think it was 
reasonable for the officer to infer a common 
enterprise among the three men. The quantity of 
drugs and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of 
drug dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would 
be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the 
potential to furnish evidence against him. 
In m, a federal investigator had been told by an 
informant, Reed, that he was to receive counterfeit 
gasoline ration coupons from a certain Buttitta at a 
particular place. The investigator went to the 
appointed place and saw Reed, the sole occupant of 
the rear seat of the car, holding gasoline ration 
coupons. There were two other occupants in the car: 
Buttitta in tlie driver's seat and Di Re in the front 
passenger's seat. Reed informed the investigator that 
Buttitta had given him counterfeit coupons. 
Thereupon, all three men were arrested and searched. 
After noting that the officers had no information 
implicating *374 Di Re and no information pointing 
to Di Re's possession of coupons, unless presence in 
the car warranted that inference, we concluded that 
the officer lacked probable cause to believe that Di 
Re was involved in the crime. 332 U.S.. at 592-594. 
68 S.Ct. 222. We said "[alny inference that 
everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must 
disappear if the Government informer singles out the 
guilty person." Id.. at 594. 68 S.Ct. 222. No such 
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singling out occurred in this case; none of the three 
men provided information with respect to the 
ownership of the cocaine or money. 
**802 We hold that the officer had probable cause to 
believe that Pringle had committed the crime of 
possession of a controlled substance. Pringle's arrest 
therefore did not contravene the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for furfher proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered, 
U.S.Md.,2003. 
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